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Trade variety and political conflict: Some international evidence

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  • Jinjarak, Yothin

Abstract

Growth in imported product variety is associated with lower internal, external, and overall political conflicts. Differentiated products, reference priced products, and organized exchange products display similar variety effects. The significance of conflict-reducing gains from variety is larger for poorer countries.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 103 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 26-28

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:103:y:2009:i:1:p:26-28

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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Keywords: Globalization Imports Networks Politics Variety;

References

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  1. David Hummels & Peter J. Klenow, 2005. "The Variety and Quality of a Nation's Exports," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 704-723, June.
  2. Anna Maria Mayda (Georgetown University) and Dani Rodrik (Harvard University), 2005. "Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-11, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Tibor Besedes & Thomas J. Prusa, 2007. "The Role of Extensive and Intensive Margins and Export Growth," NBER Working Papers 13628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Gene M. Grossman & Giovanni Maggi, 1998. "Diversity and Trade," NBER Working Papers 6741, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2002. "Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 9239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Pol Antràs & Robert W. Staiger, 2008. "Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. James E. Rauch, 1996. "Networks versus Markets in International Trade," NBER Working Papers 5617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Nunn, Nathan, 2007. "Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade," Scholarly Articles 4686801, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Judson, Ruth A. & Owen, Ann L., 1999. "Estimating dynamic panel data models: a guide for macroeconomists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 9-15, October.
  10. S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory D. Hess, 2004. "How Much Does Violence Tax Trade?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1222, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Christian Broda & David W. Weinstein, 2004. "Variety Growth and World Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 139-144, May.
  12. Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Thoenig, Mathias, 2005. "Make trade not war ?," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0515, CEPREMAP.
  13. Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Kjetil Bjorvatn & Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, 2014. "Resource Rents, Power, and Political Stability," CESifo Working Paper Series 4727, CESifo Group Munich.

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