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Resource booms and group punishment in a coupled social-ecological system

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  • Abatayo, Anna Lou
  • Lynham, John

Abstract

Climate change is altering the dynamics of common pool resources around the world. We design an experimental game that varies both the flow of natural resources and the group punishment mechanisms available to resource users. Our experiments show that subjects are more likely to over-harvest when resource flows are high. But group punishment mechanisms that rely on social ostracism (as opposed to fines or fees) are more effective at mediating the desire to over-harvest when resources are booming. This suggests that collective management systems based on social norms, exclusion, and ostracism may be more resilient to unexpected changes in resource dynamics and supports bottom-up, as opposed to top-down, management of common pool resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Abatayo, Anna Lou & Lynham, John, 2023. "Resource booms and group punishment in a coupled social-ecological system," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:206:y:2023:i:c:s0921800922003913
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107730
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chiara D’Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paolo Rosato, 2023. "Common-Property Resource Exploitation: A Real Options Approach," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(7), pages 1-22, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Resource curse; Common pool resources; Social ostracism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics

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