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Can more be less? An experimental test of the resource curse

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  • Al-Ubaydli, Omar
  • McCabe, Kevin
  • Twieg, Peter

Abstract

Several scholars have argued that abundant natural resources can be harmful to economic performance under bad institutions and helpful when institutions are good. These arguments have either been theoretical or based on naturally-occurring variation in natural resource wealth. We test this theory using a laboratory experiment to reap the benefits of randomized control. We conduct this experiment in a virtual world (Second LifeTM) to make institutions more visceral. We find support for the theory.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 55381.

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Date of creation: 31 Mar 2014
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:55381

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Keywords: resource curse; institutions; economic development;

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