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The effect of traffic cameras on police effort: Evidence from India

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  • Conover, Emily
  • Kraynak, Daniel
  • Singh, Prakarsh

Abstract

Using a novel data set on CCTV cameras in Chandigarh, India, we test whether police officers’ effort changes in response to the presence of traffic cameras. Although the cameras are useful in sanctioning drivers, they can also capture the passive (shirking) or active (rent-seeking) corruption of officers. Accounting for the spatial and temporal variations in the operation of the cameras, we find that the presence of a functioning camera results in an increase in on-the-ground tickets. Although we do not rule out possible decreases in rent-seeking behavior, a decline in passive corruption appears to be driving the increase in officer ticketing behavior, particularly for the most common vehicles and violations that can be observed from the CCTV cameras. Our findings indicate that remote monitoring technology can serve, if not a substitute for, then as a complement to on-the-ground enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Conover, Emily & Kraynak, Daniel & Singh, Prakarsh, 2023. "The effect of traffic cameras on police effort: Evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:160:y:2023:i:c:s0304387822000992
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102953
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Police; Monitoring; Shirking; Public sector; Traffic violations; Corruption; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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