IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v115y2015icp73-84.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Microfinance and dynamic incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Shapiro, D.A.

Abstract

Dynamic incentives, where incentives to repay are generated by granting access to future loans, are one of the methodologies used by microfinance institutions (MFIs). In this paper, I present a model of dynamic incentives where lenders are uncertain over how much borrowers value future loans. Loan terms are determined endogenously, and loans become more favorable as the probability of default becomes lower. I show that in all equilibria but one all borrowers, including the most patient ones, eventually default. I then consider an extension where borrowers can take loans from several lenders, double-dipping. Qualitatively, properties of equilibria with and without double-dipping are similar. In absolute terms, when borrowers are credit-constrained double-dipping equilibrium loans have to be more favorable to outweigh increased gains from default.

Suggested Citation

  • Shapiro, D.A., 2015. "Microfinance and dynamic incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 73-84.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:115:y:2015:i:c:p:73-84
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.03.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387815000383
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.03.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rui Albuquerque & Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2004. "Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 285-315.
    2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    3. Vogelgesang, Ulrike, 2003. "Microfinance in Times of Crisis: The Effects of Competition, Rising Indebtedness, and Economic Crisis on Repayment Behavior," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 2085-2114, December.
    4. Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1994. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(1), pages 81-108.
    5. Dean Karlan, Ryan Knight, and Christopher Udry, 2012. "Hoping to Win, Expected to Lose: Theory and Lessons on Microenterprise Development," Working Papers 312, Center for Global Development.
    6. Guha, Brishti & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2013. "Micro-finance competition: Motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 86-102.
    7. Jonathan de Quidt & Thiemo Fetzer & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2018. "Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(610), pages 1019-1046, May.
    8. David McKenzie & Christopher Woodruff, 2008. "Experimental Evidence on Returns to Capital and Access to Finance in Mexico," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 22(3), pages 457-482, November.
    9. Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 2016. "Information and Enforcement in Informal Credit Markets," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(329), pages 59-90, January.
    10. Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee, 2013. "Microcredit Under the Microscope: What Have We Learned in the Past Two Decades, and What Do We Need to Know?," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 487-519, May.
    11. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
    12. Eaton, Jonathan, 1996. "Sovereign Debt, Reputation and Credit Terms," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 1(1), pages 25-35, January.
    13. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2011. "Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(6), pages 1869-1918, November.
    14. Watson, Joel, 2002. "Starting Small and Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 176-199, January.
    15. Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December.
    16. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    17. Suresh de Mel & David McKenzie & Christopher Woodruff, 2009. "Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 423-423.
    18. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-1097, December.
    19. Fischer, Greg & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2010. "Repayment frequency in microfinance contracts with present-biased borrowers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58184, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. Dower, Paul & Potamites, Elizabeth, 2005. "Signaling Credit-Worthiness: Land Titles, Banking Practices and Access to Formal Credit in Indonesia," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19120, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    21. Dominik Egli, 2004. "Progressive Lending as an Enforcement Mechanism in Microfinance Programs," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(4), pages 505-520, November.
    22. Jonathan de Quidt & Thiemo Fetzer & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2018. "Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(610), pages 1019-1046, May.
    23. Craig McIntosh & Alain Janvry & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 2005. "How Rising Competition Among Microfinance Institutions Affects Incumbent Lenders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 987-1004, October.
    24. McIntosh, Craig & Wydick, Bruce, 2005. "Competition and microfinance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 271-298, December.
    25. Naveen Kumar K, 2012. "Dynamic Incentives in Microfinance Group Lending," SAGE Open, , vol. 2(2), pages 21582440124, April.
    26. Bond, Philip & Rai, Ashok S., 2009. "Borrower runs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 185-191, March.
    27. Watson, Joel, 1999. "Starting Small and Renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 52-90, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sara Biancini & David Ettinger & Baptiste Venet, 2017. "Mission Drift in Microcredit and Microfinance Institution Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 6332, CESifo.
    2. Shiqu Zhou, 2020. "Dynamic incentives in microfinance with commitment‐type borrower," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 1199-1210, August.
    3. Dasgupta, Dyotona & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2023. "A theory of progressive lending," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 211-227.
    4. Jon Einar Flatnes, 2021. "Information Sharing and Rationing in Credit Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(3), pages 944-960, May.
    5. Sara Biancini & David Ettinger & Baptiste Venet, 2021. "When Pro-Poor Microcredit Institutions Favor Richer Borrowers - A Moral Hazard Story," CESifo Working Paper Series 8893, CESifo.
    6. Ding, Zhao & Jiang, Yuansheng, 2020. "Experience, learning behavior, and rural households’ preferences for microfinance," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304308, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    7. Francesco Cecchi & Tinka Koster & Robert Lensink, 2021. "Liquidity defaults and progressive lending in microfinance: A lab‐in‐the field experiment in Bolivia," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 2013-2030, November.
    8. Hubert Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2021. "Proximity‐based screening tools and credit rationing: Lessons from a Cameroonian greenfield microfinance institution," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 33(3), pages 506-517, September.
    9. Nahla Dhib & Arvind Ashta, 2020. "How far can we go? Determining the optimal loan size in progressive lending," Working Papers hal-03001840, HAL.
    10. Dyotona Dasgupta & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2020. "Simultaneous Borrowing and Saving in Microfinance," Discussion Papers 20-09, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    11. Lucas Lopes Ferreira de Souza & Francesca Bassi & Ana Augusta Ferreira de Freitas, 2021. "Longitudinal analysis of microfinance borrowers in Brazil: A dynamic market segmentation," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(6), pages 1063-1083, August.
    12. Fujimoto, Junichi & Lee, Junsang, 2020. "Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 60-79.
    13. Singh, Nirvikar, 2018. "Financial Inclusion: Concepts, Issues and Policies for India," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt98p5m37s, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    14. Sara Biancini & David Ettinger & Baptiste Venet, 2024. "When pro‐poor microcredit institutions favour richer borrowers: A moral hazard story," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 225-242, February.
    15. Richard A. Gallenstein & Jon Einar Flatnes & John P. Dougherty & Abdoul G. Sam & Khushbu Mishra, 2021. "The impact of index‐insured loans on credit market participation and risk‐taking," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 52(1), pages 141-156, January.
    16. Sara Biancini & David Ettinger & Baptiste Venet, 2019. "Mission Drift in Microcredit: A Contract Theory Approach," Working Papers hal-02304352, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. de Quidt, Jonathan & Fetzer, Thiemo & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2016. "Group lending without joint liability," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 217-236.
    2. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 167-180.
    3. Brown, Martin & Serra-García, Marta, 2014. "The Threat of Exclusion and Implicit Contracting," Working Papers on Finance 1407, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Jun 2016.
    4. Martin Brown & Marta Serra-Garcia, 2017. "The Threat of Exclusion and Implicit Contracting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(12), pages 4081-4100, December.
    5. de Quidt, Jonathan & Fetzer, Thiemo & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2018. "Commercialization and the decline of joint liability microcredit," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 209-225.
    6. Brown, M. & Serra Garcia, M., 2010. "Relational Contracting Under the Threat of Expropriation – Experimental Evidence," Other publications TiSEM 2a3179b3-7300-4aee-a62f-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Dasgupta, Dyotona & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2023. "A theory of progressive lending," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 211-227.
    8. Wei, Dong, 2019. "A model of trust building with anonymous re-matching," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 311-327.
    9. Guha, Brishti & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2013. "Micro-finance competition: Motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 86-102.
    10. Hossain, Shahadat & Galbreath, Jeremy & Hasan, Mostafa Monzur & Randøy, Trond, 2020. "Does competition enhance the double-bottom-line performance of microfinance institutions?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    11. Shyamal Chowdhury & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Discussion Papers 14-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    12. Ahlin, Christian, 2015. "The role of group size in group lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 140-155.
    13. Ashim Kumar Kar & Ranjula Bali Swain, 2018. "Competition, Performance and Portfolio Quality in Microfinance Markets," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 30(5), pages 842-870, December.
    14. Brown, Martin & Serra-Garcia, Marta, 2011. "The Threat of Exclusion and Relational Contracting," Discussion Papers in Economics 12287, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    15. Allen, Treb, 2016. "Optimal (partial) group liability in microfinance lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 201-216.
    16. Moh’d Al-Azzam & Christopher Parmeter, 2021. "Competition and microcredit interest rates: international evidence," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 829-868, February.
    17. Janda, Karel & Zetek, Pavel, 2014. "Mikrofinanční Revoluce: Aktuální Kontroverze A Výzvy [Microfinance Revolution: Recent Controversies And Challenges]," MPRA Paper 54098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Kazushi Takahashi & Abu Shonchoy & Seiro Ito & Takashi Kurosaki, 2017. "How Does Contract Design Affect the Uptake of Microcredit among the Ultra-poor? Experimental Evidence from the River Islands of Northern Bangladesh," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(4), pages 530-547, April.
    19. Brishti Guha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2014. "Borrower Targeting under Microfinance Competition with Motivated Microfinance Institutions and Strategic Complementarity," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 52(3), pages 211-240, September.
    20. Emilios Galariotis & Christophe Villa & Nurmukhammad Yusupov, 2011. "Recent Advances in Lending to the Poor with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(9), pages 1371-1390, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:115:y:2015:i:c:p:73-84. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.