Dynamic Incentives in Microfinance Group Lending
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DOI: 10.1177/2158244012444280
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Ismail, Abdul Ghafar & Yussof, Wan Nor AisyahWan, 2015. "Group Lending Policy and Repayment Rate in Islamic Microfinance Institutions," Policy Papers 1435-1, The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute (IRTI).
- Kamaluddin, Amrizah & Hadi, Nabawiyah Abdul & Alam, Md. Mahmudul & Adil, Mohamed Azam Mohamed, 2019. "Social Collateral Model for Islamic Microfinance," SocArXiv ya8ft, Center for Open Science.
- Disha Bhanot & Varadraj Bapat, 2019. "Contributory factors towards sustainability of bank-linked self-help groups in India," Asia-Pacific Sustainable Development Journal, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), vol. 26(2), pages 25-55, December.
- Gehrig, Stefan & Mesoudi, Alex & Lamba, Shakti, 2020. "Banking on cooperation: An evolutionary analysis of microfinance loan repayment behaviour," OSF Preprints tmpqj, Center for Open Science.
- Shapiro, D.A., 2015. "Microfinance and dynamic incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 73-84.
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Keywords
asymmetries of information; dynamic incentives; group lending; self-help group; microfinance;All these keywords.
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