A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold
AbstractThis article demonstrates that Ricardian equivalence does not necessarily hold in models with altruistic transfers once one takes into account the strategic behavior of recipients as well as donors. To influence the final allocation of consumption in altruistic settings, potential recipients can threaten to refuse transfers. The authors apply the extended Nash bargaining solution to the problem of an altruistic parent and a possible altruistic child. They show that when the government redistributes between the parent and child, it changes their endowments and the equilibrium threats and, thus, the final allocation of consumption. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 100 (1990)
Issue (Month): 403 (December)
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- Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Assaf Razin & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1988. "A Strategic Altruism Model In Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold," NBER Working Papers 2699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Altonji, Joseph G & Hayashi, Fumio & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1997.
"Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence,"
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- Zhang, Jie, 2006. "Second-best public debt with human capital externalities," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 347-360, February.
- Peter Prazmowski, 2014. "Ricardian equivalence and fiscal distortions in the Dominican Republic," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 109-125, February.
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