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Single-profile axiomatizations of the plurality and the simple majority rules

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  • Adrian Miroiu

    (National University of Political Studies and Public Asministration Bucharest)

Abstract

This note presents a new axiomatization of the plurality rule. The proof appeals to a single-profile approach. An axiomatization of the simple majority rule is obtained as a corollary of it. It is shown that besides axioms that describe properties of these rules, an important role is played by restrictions on the form of the choice rules or on the general frame (the number of available alternatives).

Suggested Citation

  • Adrian Miroiu, 2018. "Single-profile axiomatizations of the plurality and the simple majority rules," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 13-19.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00865
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    plurality rule; simple majority rule; axiomatization; single profile;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

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