Size and distribution of prizes and efforts in contests
AbstractThe intensity of competition in contests is affected by the sum of the awarded prizes and by the prize distribution among the contestants. The current paper examines which of these two parameters has a larger effect on the players' extent of participation in the contest.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 8 (2005)
Issue (Month): 10 ()
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