This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Gil S. Epstein
Shmuel Nitzan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In the two-stage political-economic game that we study public policy is the outcome of the interaction between interest groups and a two-tier government. Implementation of a policy proposed by a bureaucrat requires approval by an elected politician. The objective function of the bureaucrat hinges on the weight assigned to social welfare relative to the rent-seeking outlays of the interest groups. This weight represents the degree of politicization of the government. Our main result is that, in contrast to common belief, increased politicization need not adversely affect the public well-being. Copyright Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 2002.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1097-3923.00114
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 661-677
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:4:p:661-677

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1097-3923

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Ira N. Gang & Gil S. Epstein, 2002. "Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making," Departmental Working Papers 200215, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2005. "Size and distribution of prizes and efforts in contests," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(10), pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
  3. Epstein, Gil S & Gang, Ira, 2004. "Who is the Enemy?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4524, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Boerner, Kira, 2005. "Having Everyone in the Boat May Sink it - Interest Group Involvement and Policy Reforms," Discussion Papers in Economics 730, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2005. "Lobbying and Compromise," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  6. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2002. "Effort and Performance in Public-Policy Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also covers the most complete directory of Economics departments and institutes, EDIRC.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.