Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties
AbstractThis paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 200629.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2006
Date of revision:
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foreign aid; rent seeking; governance; decentralization;
Other versions of this item:
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
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