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Contests, NGOs and Decentralizing Aid

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Author Info

  • Epstein, Gil S.

    ()
    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Gang, Ira N.

    ()
    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

International donors usually have particular goals they want to achieve with their foreign aid, for example, poverty alleviation. In the international aid story lobbying by potential recipient groups attempting to capture the donor's support play a potentially important role for nongovernmental organizations. We model this situation as a hierarchical contest and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process with nongovernmental organizations as intermediaries.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1711.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Review of Development Economics, 2006, 10 (2), 285-296
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1711

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Keywords: aid; contests; NGOs;

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References

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  1. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination," CESifo Working Paper Series 646, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2000. " Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 285-96, June.
  3. Richard Allard, 1988. "Rent-seeking with non-identical players," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 3-14, April.
  4. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  5. Gil S . Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(4), pages 661-677, October.
  6. Chau, Nancy H. & Huysentruyt, Marieke, 2006. "Nonprofits and public good provision: A contest based on compromises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(8), pages 1909-1935, November.
  7. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2002. "Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making," IZA Discussion Papers 547, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Gradstein, Mark, 1994. "Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 877-97, November.
  9. Konrad, Kai A, 1994. "The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private and Public Provision of Public Goods," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(241), pages 79-92, February.
  10. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Politics of Randomness," CESifo Working Paper Series 803, CESifo Group Munich.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2009. "Good governance and good aid allocation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 12-18, May.
  2. Dirk-Jan Koch & Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele, 2008. "Keeping a Low Profile: What Determines the Allocation of Aid by Non-Governmental Organizations?," KOF Working papers, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich 08-191, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  3. Peter Nunnenkamp & Janina Weingarth & Johannes Weisser, 2008. "Is NGO Aid Not So Different After All? Comparing the Allocation of Swiss Aid by Private and Official Donors," Kiel Working Papers 1405, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  4. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2009. "Poverty and Governance: The Contest for Aid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(s1), pages 382-392, 08.
  5. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics 200629, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  6. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "The Hope for Hysteresis in Foreign Aid," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics 200628, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  7. Nicola Banks & David Hulme, 2012. "The role of NGOs and civil society in development and poverty reduction," Brooks World Poverty Institute Working Paper Series, BWPI, The University of Manchester 17112, BWPI, The University of Manchester.

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