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Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid

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Author Info
Gil S. Epstein
Ira N. Gang

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Abstract

International donors usually have particular goals they want to achieve with their foreign aid, e.g., poverty alleviation. In the international aid story lobbying by potential recipient groups attempting to capture the donor's support plays a potentially important role for non-governmental organizations. We model this situation as a hierarchical contest and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process with non-governmental organizations as intermediaries. Copyright © 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00318.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
Pages: 285-296
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Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:285-296

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(4), pages 661-677, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2000. " Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 285-96, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2002. "Politics of Randomness," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Chau, Nancy H. & Huysentruyt, Marieke, 2006. "Nonprofits and public good provision: A contest based on compromises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(8), pages 1909-1935, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2002. "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2002. "Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making," IZA Discussion Papers 547, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Konrad, Kai A, 1994. "The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private and Public Provision of Public Goods," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(241), pages 79-92, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Peter Nunnenkamp & Janina Weingarth & Johannes Weisser, 2008. "Is NGO Aid Not So Different After All? Comparing the Allocation of Swiss Aid by Private and Official Donors," Kiel Working Papers 1405, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dirk-Jan Koch & Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele, 2008. "Keeping a Low Profile: What Determines the Allocation of Aid by Non-Governmental Organizations?," Kiel Working Papers 1406, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "The Hope for Hysteresis in Foreign Aid," Departmental Working Papers 200628, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties," Departmental Working Papers 200629, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2008. "Good Governance and Good Aid Allocation," IZA Discussion Papers 3585, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2008. "Poverty and Governance: The Contest for Aid," Working Papers RP2008/76, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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