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Information, Investment Horizon, and Price Reactions

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  • Thakor, Anjan V.

Abstract

This paper studies the dynamic investment policies of firms under asymmetric information. Managers make decisions to maximize the wealth of existing shareholders. In equilibrium, the superior firms invest 'myopically', choosing intrinsically lower-valued projects that produce 'early' cash flows. The inferior firms follow the socially preferred rule of investing in intrinsically higher-valued projects that product 'late' cash flows. In addition to explaining investment myopia, the model generates numerous predictions regarding announcement effects of equity issues and attempts by firms to stockpile cash, firms' preferences for limits on mandatory disclosure rules, and the effects of managerial entrenchment motives.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.

Volume (Year): 28 (1993)
Issue (Month): 04 (December)
Pages: 459-482

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Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:28:y:1993:i:04:p:459-482_00

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References

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  1. David Besanko & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market under Asymmetric Information," Finance 0411045, EconWPA.
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  4. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
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  7. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.
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  11. Stein, Jeremy C, 1988. "Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 61-80, February.
  12. Bronwyn H. Hall, 1988. "The Effect of Takeover Activity on Corporate Research and Development," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 69-100 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  16. Hirshleifer, David & Suh, Yoon, 1992. "Risk, managerial effort, and project choice," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 308-345, September.
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  18. Robert A. Korajczyk & Deborah Lucas & Robert L. McDonald, 1990. "Understanding Stock Price Behavior around the Time of Equity Issues," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 257-278 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  21. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Ritter, Jay R, 1983. "Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 331-46, April.
  22. McConnell, John J. & Muscarella, Chris J., 1985. "Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the firm," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 399-422, September.
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  24. Ronald M. Giammarino, Tracy Lewis, 1988. "A Theory of Negotiated Equity Financing," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(3), pages 265-288.
  25. Boot, Arnoud W A, 1992. " Why Hang on to Losers? Divestitures and Takeovers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1401-23, September.
  26. Hirshleifer, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1992. "Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 437-70.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Prezas, Alexandros P., 2009. "Internal capital markets, empire building, and capital structure," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 173-188.
  2. Mehdi Nehkili & Evelyne Poincelot, 2000. "La fonction R&D et la latitude managériale: une analyse théorique," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 3(1), pages 5-28, March.
  3. Simon Grant & Stephen King & Ben Polak, 1995. "Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1107, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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