The Impact of Anti-Temporary Replacement Legislation on Work Stoppages: Empirical Evidence from Canada
AbstractLegislation that prevents the hiring of temporary replacement workers during a work stoppage is controversial. "Anti-temporary replacement worker" legislation (ATR) or "anti-scab" legislation is currently in effect in Quebec and British Columbia and existed for a short period of time in Ontario. This paper uses variation over time (1978-2003) and across provinces to provide empirical evidence concerning the impact of ATR on work stoppages. The results show that ATR increases strike incidence and decreases strike length - both effects are statistically significant and substantial in magnitude. Incidence and length have opposing effects on days lost to work stoppages. Empirical results provide weak evidence that anti-scab legislation may increase days lost to work stoppages in the first two years after the legislation takes effect but no evidence that such legislation has a statistically significant effect on days lost when it has been in effect for more than two years.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Toronto Press in its journal Canadian Public Policy.
Volume (Year): 35 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Toronto Press Journals Division 5201 Dufferin Street Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3H 5T8
Web page: http://economics.ca/cpp/
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Morley Gunderson & John Kervin & Frank Reid, 1989. "The Effect of Labour Relations Legislation on Strike Incidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(4), pages 779-94, November.
- Peter Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph Tracy, 1999.
"The Effect Of Collective Bargaining Legislation On Strikes And Wages,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 81(3), pages 475-487, August.
- Peter Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph Tracy, 1999. "The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages," Papers of Peter Cramton 99res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 30 Jul 1998.
- Peter C. Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph S. Tracy, 1995. "The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages," NBER Working Papers 5105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gunderson, Morley & Melino, Angelo, 1990. "The Effects of Public Policy on Strike Duration," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(3), pages 295-316, July.
- John W. Budd & Yijiang Wang, 2004. "Labor policy and investment: Evidence from Canada," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 57(3), pages 386-401, April.
- Budd, J.W., 1993. "Canadian Strike Replacement Legislation and Collective Bargainig : Lessons for United States," Papers 93-08, Minnesota - Industrial Relations Center.
- Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, 2003. "Unions, Bargaining and Strikes," Papers of Peter Cramton 02ubs, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 05 Sep 2002.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.