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An organizational economics approach to the existence of sharecropping

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  • Jiancai PI

    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Nanjing University, Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province, China)

Abstract

The paper provides a new explanation for the existence of sharecropping in agriculture from the perspective of organizational economics. Similar to a multinational enterprise's decision of whether to enter a joint venture or to choose a wholly owned subsidiary, we can see sharecropping as a joint venture and a fixed rent contract as a wholly owned subsidiary when we stand in the tenant's position. Our analysis shows that when the landlord has a strong enough comparative advantage in exerting one type of effort, he/she tends to choose the share contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiancai PI, 2013. "An organizational economics approach to the existence of sharecropping," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 59(11), pages 537-541.
  • Handle: RePEc:caa:jnlage:v:59:y:2013:i:11:id:127-2012-agricecon
    DOI: 10.17221/127/2012-AGRICECON
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    References listed on IDEAS

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