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Determinants of Access to Legislative and Executive Branch Officials: Business Firms and Trade Policymaking in the U.S

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Listed:
  • Schuler Douglas A.

    (Rice University)

  • Rehbein Kathleen

    (Marquette University)

Abstract

We examine the characteristics of business firms that gain access to legislative and executive branch officials in the trade policymaking area. Our empirical analysis of over 1200 manufacturers reveals that legislators were most attracted to firms with foreign market expertise, firms which actively participated in politics with outside lobbyists and campaign contributions, and firms with significant employment in the state and/or district. Executive branch officials were responsive to firms with foreign market expertise, firms from industries that had previously received tariff protection, firms using in-house government affairs specialists and outside lobbyists to convey information, and firms making campaign contributions to members of the trade oversight legislative committees. Our results largely support the political market framework and provide insights about the attractiveness of certain demanders to suppliers of trade policies from the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. federal government.

Suggested Citation

  • Schuler Douglas A. & Rehbein Kathleen, 2011. "Determinants of Access to Legislative and Executive Branch Officials: Business Firms and Trade Policymaking in the U.S," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-32, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:13:y:2011:i:3:n:4
    DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1340
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nownes Anthony J. & Aitalieva Nurgul R., 2013. "The political activities of American corporate leaders," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(4), pages 493-527, December.
    2. Alves, Amanda M. & Brousseau, Eric & Mimouni, Nada & Yeung, Timothy Yu-Cheong, 2021. "Competing for policy: Lobbying in the EU wholesale roaming regulation," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(3).
    3. Thurston Chloe & Bowen Kathryn, 2011. "U.S. Domestic Politics and International Political Economy: An Introduction to the Special Issue," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-6, October.

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