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Abstract

The relationship between income and voting is usually studied using current income. Instead, I estimate how permanent income affects voting and to what extent voters are forward looking. A proxy for permanent income is constructed from stated expectations about one's future economic situation. Using panel data from the Norwegian Election Study I estimate the effect of stated expectations on realized future income to compute the effect of expectations. This is then linked to voting behaviour. Contrasting permanent and transitory income, the former has a large impact and the latter has little explanatory power on voting. This supports the hypothesis of forward looking voting. A high expected permanent income increase the propensity to vote Conservative.

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File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1527&context=bejm
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics.

Volume (Year): 7 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 19

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejmac:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:19

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Related research

Keywords: voting; permanent income; redistribution;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
• D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
• D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
• H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
• H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs

References

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Cited by:

1. Jo Thori Lind, 2005. "Why is there so little redistribution?," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, pages 111-125.

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