Do the Rich Vote Conservative Because They Are Rich?
AbstractPolitical economics predicts that the rich oppose redistribution and vote for conservative parties. Although this seemingly fits the data well in most countries, I show that the relationship breaks down when we control for unobservable characteristics. Using Norwegian survey data, I study to what extent voting is caused by income. Although a positive association between income and conservative voting persists when controlling for unobservables, the magnitude of the effect is reduced by a factor of five. To correct for measurement error, I instrument income with average income by profession. The magnitude of the coefficients becomes higher, but the main conclusion remains.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Università di Perugia in its journal Review of Economics and Institutions.
Volume (Year): 1 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
political economy; redistribution; voting; multinomial logit; panel data;
Other versions of this item:
- Lind, Jo Thori, 2006. "Do the rich vote Conservative because they are rich?," Memorandum 02/2006, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
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- Lind Jo Thori, 2007.
"Does Permanent Income Determine the Vote?,"
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics,
De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-27, July.
- Jo Thori Lind, 2005. "Why is there so little redistribution?," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, pages 111-125.
- Markussen, Simen, 2008. "How the left prospers from prosperity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 329-342, June.
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