Do the rich vote Conservative because they are rich?
AbstractPolitical economy models predict that the rich oppose redistribution, and hence vote for conservative parties. Although this seems to fit the data well, I show that this is not true when we control for unobservable characteristics. Using Norwegian survey data, I study to what extent voting is caused by income. Unobserved characteristics correlated with income are handled by using fixed effects panel data discrete choice models. Although a positive association between income and conservative voting persists when controlling for unobservables, the magnitude of the effect is reduced by a factor of five. To correct for measurement error, I instrument income with average income by profession. The magnitude of the coefficients is increased, but the main conclusions remain.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 02/2006.
Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 03 Feb 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Political economy; redistribution; voting; multinomial logit; panel data;
Other versions of this item:
- Jo Thori Lind, 2010. "Do the Rich Vote Conservative Because They Are Rich?," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 1(2).
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-02-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2006-02-12 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-PBE-2006-02-12 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-02-12 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Lind, Jo Thori, 2005.
"Does permanent income determine the vote?,"
23/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Jo Thori Lind, 2005. "Why is there so little redistribution?," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, pages 111-125.
- Markussen, Simen, 2008. "How the left prospers from prosperity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 329-342, June.
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