eBay's Buy-It-Now Function: Who, When, and How
AbstractThis paper utilizes field experiment methodology and market data to study the "Buy-it-Now" (BIN) function in a series of eBay coin auctions. BIN auctions are typically listed by sellers with higher reputations. The probability an auction will end BIN increases with seller reputation and is not significantly affected by negative comments. Auctions listed by new sellers average lower prices and are less likely to end BIN. Buyer use of the BIN option increases as the BIN price decreases. We find that price is directly related to seller reputation, though not affected by negative comments, and is negatively related to buyer reputation. This result is driven by those auctions that start with a BIN price.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy.
Volume (Year): 4 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
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- Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2010.
"Buy-It-Now prices in eBay Auctions - The Field in the Lab,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
294, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Tim Grebe & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2009. "Buy-it-Now Prices in eBay Auctions-The Field in the Lab," Cahiers de recherche 0950, CIRPEE.
- Nicholas Shunda, 2007.
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2007-42, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Shunda, Nicholas, 2009. "Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 645-664, November.
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