IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/stratm/v43y2022i10p1983-2011.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do managers capture the value they create? Drivers of managers' value capture in a large retail chain

Author

Listed:
  • Federica De Stefano
  • Matthew Bidwell
  • Arnaldo Camuffo

Abstract

Research Summary We investigate the relationship between value creation and value capture among frontline managers. Using longitudinal data from a restaurant chain, we find that those managers who persistently create more value for the firm capture just 0.5% of that extra value through their pay. We explore the reasons for this limited managerial value capture using an abductive approach. We find some evidence that value capture may be limited by lack of alternative employment opportunities. More extensive evidence suggests that the employer often struggled to identify individual contributions to value creation, limiting managerial rewards. We discuss the theoretical implications of such limited managerial value capture for the strategic human capital literature. Managerial Summary Frontline managers can differ in how much they contribute to firm profitability. Do those managers who contribute the most to firm performance also capture those benefits back through higher pay? In a study of restaurant managers, we find that managers differ substantially in the profits that they create, but that the most profitable managers only capture 0.5% of the extra profits they create. We also find evidence that the firm often fails to identify which managers are the most persistently profitable, potentially reducing the rewards paid to those managers. By demonstrating that differences in performance are not balanced by differences in pay, we show how high‐performing managers can be an important strategic resource for organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Federica De Stefano & Matthew Bidwell & Arnaldo Camuffo, 2022. "Do managers capture the value they create? Drivers of managers' value capture in a large retail chain," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(10), pages 1983-2011, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:stratm:v:43:y:2022:i:10:p:1983-2011
    DOI: 10.1002/smj.3401
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3401
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/smj.3401?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2008. "Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 49-100.
    2. Thomas Lemieux & W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 2009. "Performance Pay and Wage Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 1-49.
    3. Timothy J. Quigley & Scott D. Graffin, 2017. "Reaffirming the CEO effect is significant and much larger than chance: A comment on Fitza (2014)," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 793-801, March.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 79-119.
    5. Reinhard Schunck, 2013. "Within and between estimates in random-effects models: Advantages and drawbacks of correlated random effects and hybrid models," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 13(1), pages 65-76, March.
    6. John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David N. Margolis, 1999. "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 251-334, March.
    7. Edward P. Lazear & Kathryn L. Shaw & Christopher T. Stanton, 2015. "The Value of Bosses," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(4), pages 823-861.
    8. David Card & Ana Rute Cardoso & Joerg Heining & Patrick Kline, 2018. "Firms and Labor Market Inequality: Evidence and Some Theory," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S1), pages 13-70.
    9. James L. Medoff & Katharine G. Abraham, 1980. "Experience, Performance, and Earnings," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 95(4), pages 703-736.
    10. Kristin Behfar & Gerardo A. Okhuysen, 2018. "Perspective—Discovery Within Validation Logic: Deliberately Surfacing, Complementing, and Substituting Abductive Reasoning in Hypothetico-Deductive Inquiry," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(2), pages 323-340, April.
    11. Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger, 2008. "Envy, comparison costs, and the economic theory of the firm," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(13), pages 1429-1449, December.
    12. Andrew Bell & Malcolm Fairbrother & Kelvyn Jones, 2019. "Fixed and random effects models: making an informed choice," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 1051-1074, March.
    13. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
    14. Benjamin A. Campbell & Martin Ganco & April M. Franco & Rajshree Agarwal, 2012. "Who leaves, where to, and why worry? employee mobility, entrepreneurship and effects on source firm performance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(1), pages 65-87, January.
    15. Ethan Mollick, 2012. "People and process, suits and innovators: the role of individuals in firm performance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(9), pages 1001-1015, September.
    16. Steven W. Floyd & Bill Wooldridge, 1997. "Middle Management’s Strategic Influence and Organizational Performance," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 465-485, May.
    17. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    18. Martin Ganco, 2013. "Cutting the Gordian knot: The effect of knowledge complexity on employee mobility and entrepreneurship," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(6), pages 666-686, June.
    19. Rajshree Agarwal & Martin Ganco & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, 2009. "Reputations for toughness in patent enforcement: implications for knowledge spillovers via inventor mobility," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(13), pages 1349-1374, December.
    20. Adina Dabu & Clint Chadwick, 2009. "Human Resources, Human Resource Management, and the Competitive Advantage of Firms: Toward a More Comprehensive Model of Causal Linkages," Post-Print hal-00481157, HAL.
    21. Claudine Gartenberg & Julie Wulf, 2017. "Pay Harmony? Social Comparison and Performance Compensation in Multibusiness Firms," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 39-55, February.
    22. Ian Larkin, 2014. "The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 199-227.
    23. Markus A. Fitza, 2014. "The use of variance decomposition in the investigation of CEO effects: How large must the CEO effect be to rule out chance?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(12), pages 1839-1852, December.
    24. Orley C. Ashenfelter & Henry Farber & Michael R Ransom, 2010. "Labor Market Monopsony," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 203-210, April.
    25. Frank, Robert H, 1984. "Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 549-571, September.
    26. Bang Dang Nguyen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, 2014. "What Death Can Tell: Are Executives Paid for Their Contributions to Firm Value?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 2994-3010, December.
    27. Clint Chadwick & Adina Dabu, 2009. "Human Resources, Human Resource Management, and the Competitive Advantage of Firms: Toward a More Comprehensive Model of Causal Linkages," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(1), pages 253-272, February.
    28. Adelaide Wilcox King & Carl P. Zeithaml, 2001. "Competencies and firm performance: examining the causal ambiguity paradox," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 75-99, January.
    29. Elaine Mosakowski, 1997. "Strategy Making Under Causal Ambiguity: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Evidence," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(4), pages 414-442, August.
    30. Michael Gibbs & Wallace Hendricks, 2004. "Do Formal Salary Systems Really Matter?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 58(1), pages 71-93, October.
    31. Shawn M. Riley & Steven C. Michael & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2017. "Human capital matters: Market valuation of firm investments in training and the role of complementary assets," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(9), pages 1895-1914, September.
    32. S. Trevis Certo & Michael C. Withers & Matthew Semadeni, 2017. "A tale of two effects: Using longitudinal data to compare within- and between-firm effects," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(7), pages 1536-1556, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Bias, Daniel & Chen, Lin & Lochner, Benjamin & Schmid, Thomas, 2020. "Measuring workers' financial incentives," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 07/2020, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    3. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    5. Louise Lindbjerg & Theodor Vladasel, 2021. "Hiring Entrepreneurs for Innovation," Working Papers 1309, Barcelona School of Economics.
    6. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
    7. Ekinci, Emre, 2022. "Employee entrepreneurship and signaling role of corporate venturing decisions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    8. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Ian Gregory‐Smith, 2021. "Wages And Labor Productivity: Evidence From Injuries In The National Football League," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(2), pages 829-847, April.
    10. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
    11. Bassi, Vittorio & Nyshadham, Anant & Tamayo, Jorge & Adhvaryu, Achyuta, 2020. "No Line Left Behind: Assortative Matching Inside the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 14554, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Emilie R. Feldman, 2016. "Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(10), pages 2011-2030, October.
    13. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
    14. Antonio Cabrales, 2010. "The causes and economic consequences of envy," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 1(4), pages 371-386, September.
    15. Christopher Cornwell & Ian M. Schmutte & Daniela Scur, 2021. "Building a Productive Workforce: The Role of Structured Management Practices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7308-7321, December.
    16. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
    17. Oriana Bandiera & Luigi Guiso & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2015. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 623-681.
    18. Michael Böhm & Daniel Metzger & Per Strömberg, 2022. "“Since You’re So Rich, You Must Be Really Smart”: Talent, Rent Sharing, and the Finance Wage Premium," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 147, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    19. Stanton, Christopher T. & Sandvik, Jason & Saouma, Richard & Seegert, Nathan, 2018. "Analyzing the Aftermath of a Compensation Reduction," CEPR Discussion Papers 13242, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Agarwal, Rajshree & Shah, Sonali K., 2014. "Knowledge sources of entrepreneurship: Firm formation by academic, user and employee innovators," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1109-1133.
    21. Engbom, Niklas & Moser, Christian & Sauermann, Jan, 2023. "Firm pay dynamics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 233(2), pages 396-423.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:stratm:v:43:y:2022:i:10:p:1983-2011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/0143-2095 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.