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Severance Payment: Incentive or Lethargy Effect?

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  • Yannick Gabuthy
  • Eve-Angéline Lambert
  • Lionel Thomas

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  • Yannick Gabuthy & Eve-Angéline Lambert & Lionel Thomas, 2013. "Severance Payment: Incentive or Lethargy Effect?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-55, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:60:y:2013:i:1:p:43-55
    DOI: sjpe.12001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
    2. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    3. Etienne Wasmer, 2006. "General versus Specific Skills in Labor Markets with Search Frictions and Firing Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 811-831, June.
    4. Masanori Hashimoto & Ben T. Yu, 1980. "Specific Capital, Employmemt Contracts, and Wage Rigidity," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 536-549, Autumn.
    5. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    6. John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira, 2003. "The Economics of Employment Protection," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, vol. 24(1), pages 85-129, January.
    7. Goerke, Laszlo & Pannenberg, Markus, 2010. "An economic analysis of dismissal legislation: Determinants of severance pay in West Germany," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 71-85, March.
    8. Miguel Malo, 2001. "European Labour Law and Severance Pay Determination in Collective Redundancies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 73-90, July.
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    10. Edward P. Lazear, 1990. "Job Security Provisions and Employment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(3), pages 699-726.
    11. Deffains, Bruno & Gabuthy, Yannick & Lambert, Eve-Angéline, 2010. "Labour disputes, investment decisions and the judiciary," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 424-433, April.
    12. Miguel Á. Malo, 2000. "A Simple Model of Severance Pay Determination: The Case of Individual Dismissals in Spain," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 14(2), pages 269-290, June.
    13. Michèle Belot & Jan Boone & Jan Van Ours, 2007. "Welfare‐Improving Employment Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(295), pages 381-396, August.
    14. Hashimoto, Masanori, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 475-482, June.
    15. Andrea Ichino & Regina T. Riphahn, 2005. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: Absenteeism During and After Probation," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 120-143, March.
    16. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation," International Economic Association Series, in: L.-A. Gérard-Varet & S.-C. Kolm & J. Mercier Ythier (ed.), The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, chapter 7, pages 153-173, Palgrave Macmillan.
    17. Jens Suedekum & Peter Ruehmann, 2003. "Severance Payments and Firm–specific Human Capital," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 17(1), pages 47-62, March.
    18. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
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    20. James M. Malcomson, 1997. "Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 1916-1957, December.
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