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Kantian Equilibrium

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  • John E. Roemer

Abstract

Consider a game whose strategies are "contributions". A strategy profile is a Kantian equilibrium if "no" player would like "all" players to alter their contributions by the "same multiplicative factor." Kantian equilibria are Pareto efficient. We characterize the allocation rules on several domains of environments that can be implemented as Kantian equilibria. The concept unifies the "proportional solution" on production economies and the "linear cost-share equilibrium" on public-good economies. We study Kantian equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma, in a voting problem, and in a political economy where redistribution is the issue. The Kantian dictum engenders considerable but not unqualified cooperation. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2010 .

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 112 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 1-24

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:112:y:2010:i:1:p:1-24

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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442

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Cited by:
  1. repec:gra:wpaper:13/06 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Unequal Exchange, Assets, and Power: Recent Developments in Exploitation Theory," Discussion Paper Series 594, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  3. Yoshihara, Naoki & Veneziani, Roberto, 2013. "The Measurement of Labour Content: A General Approach," Discussion Paper Series 587, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Sincere Lobby Formation," Working Papers 2072/151545, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  5. Dirk Helbing, 2013. "Economics 2.0: The Natural Step towards A Self-Regulating, Participatory Market Society," Papers 1305.4078, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2013.
  6. Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2013. "A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 422-430.
  7. Yoshihara, Naoki, 2014. "A Progressive Report on Marxian Economic Theory: On the Controversies in Exploitation Theory since Okishio (1963)," Discussion Paper Series 607, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

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