A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
AbstractWe define two types of natural mechanisms, quantity and price-quantity types, in convex production economies, and characterize the class of Pareto subsolutions doubly implementable in Nash and strong Nash equilibria by these mechanisms respectively. First, we show that there is a class of Pareto subsolutions doubly implementable by natural quantity mechanisms, as long as production sets have smooth boundaries. We characterize the class of Pareto subsolutions doubly implementable by natural price-quantity mechanisms without assuming differentiability of utility functions. Third, we show that the Walrasian solution is the unique Pareto and fully individually rational solution naturally and doubly implementable in private ownership economies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: 4 December 1997/Accepted: 25 August 1999
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Naoki Yoshihara, 2000. "A Characterization of Natural and Double Implementation in Production Economics," Discussion Paper Series a387, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288
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