IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/polstu/v58y2010i2p239-265.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

New Worlds in Political Science

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick Dunleavy

Abstract

‘Political science’ is a ‘vanguard’ field concerned with advancing generic knowledge of political processes, while a wider ‘political scholarship’ utilising eclectic approaches has more modest or varied ambitions. Political science nonetheless necessarily depends upon and is epistemologically comparable with political scholarship. I deploy Boyer's distinctions between discovery, integration, application and renewing the profession to show that these connections are close woven. Two sets of key challenges need to be tackled if contemporary political science is to develop positively. The first is to ditch the current unworkable and restrictive comparative politics approach, in favour of a genuinely global analysis framework. Instead of obsessively looking at data on nation states, we need to seek data completeness on the whole (multi‐level) world we have. A second cluster of challenges involves looking far more deeply into political phenomena; reaping the benefits of ‘digital‐era’ developments; moving from sample methods to online census methods in organisational analysis; analysing massive transactional databases and real‐time political processes (again, instead of depending on surveys); and devising new forms of ‘instrumentation’, informed by post‐rational choice theoretical perspectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Dunleavy, 2010. "New Worlds in Political Science," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(2), pages 239-265, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:58:y:2010:i:2:p:239-265
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00834.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00834.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00834.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Franzese, Robert J., 2005. "Empirical Strategies for Various Manifestations of Multilevel Data," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(4), pages 430-446.
    2. Chhibber, Pradeep & Kollman, Ken, 1998. "Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 329-342, June.
    3. Josep M. Colomer, 2007. "What other sciences look like," Economics Working Papers 1017, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    4. Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"," NBER Working Papers 11235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Brunk, Gregory G., 2001. "Self-Organized Criticality: A New Theory of Political Behaviour and Some of Its Implications," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(2), pages 427-445, April.
    6. Hansen, John Mark, 1985. "The Political Economy of Group Membership," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 79-96, March.
    7. Ragin, Charles C., 2000. "Fuzzy-Set Social Science," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226702773, September.
    8. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926, December.
    9. Josep M. Colomer, 1995. "Game Theory And The Transition To Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 100.
    10. Dunleavy, Patrick & Margetts, Helen & Bastow, Simon & Tinkler, Jane, 2008. "Digital Era Governance: IT Corporations, the State, and e-Government," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199547005, Decembrie.
    11. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226702766 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vlad Tarko, 2015. "The challenge of empirically assessing the effects of constitutions," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 46-76, March.
    2. Eicher, Theo S. & Schreiber, Till, 2010. "Structural policies and growth: Time series evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 169-179, January.
    3. Milan Zafirovski, 2022. "Some dilemmas of economic democracy: Indicators and empirical analysis," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 43(1), pages 252-302, February.
    4. Caruso, Germán & Scartascini, Carlos & Tommasi, Mariano, 2015. "Are we all playing the same game? The economic effects of constitutions depend on the degree of institutionalization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 212-228.
    5. Lorenz Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt & Carsten Wolf, 2009. "The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 197-225, April.
    6. Svaleryd, Helena & Vlachos, Jonas, 2009. "Political rents in a non-corrupt democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 355-372, April.
    7. James C. Rockey, 2007. "Which Democracies Pay Higher Wages?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 07/600, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    8. Minkler, Lanse & Prakash, Nishith, 2017. "The role of constitutions on poverty: A cross-national investigation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 563-581.
    9. Baland, Jean-Marie & Moene, Karl Ove & Robinson, James A., 2010. "Governance and Development," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4597-4656, Elsevier.
    10. Bartolini, David & Santolini, Raffaella, 2017. "Political institutions behind good governance," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 68-85.
    11. Stephan Litschig & Yves Zamboni, 2008. "Judicial presence and rent extraction," Economics Working Papers 1143, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2012.
    12. Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December.
    13. Luca Bettarelli & Michela Cella & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni, 2021. "It’s a matter of confidence. Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 38(2), pages 709-738, July.
    14. Martin Ardanaz & Carlos Scartascini, 2014. "The economic effects of constitutions: do budget institutions make forms of government more alike?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 301-329, September.
    15. repec:ces:ifodic:v:5:y:2007:i:3:p:14567324 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Akee, Randall & Jorgensen, Miriam & Sunde, Uwe, 2015. "Critical junctures and economic development – Evidence from the adoption of constitutions among American Indian Nations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 844-861.
    17. Chris Jeffords & Lanse Minkler, 2016. "Do Constitutions Matter? The Effects of Constitutional Environmental Rights Provisions on Environmental Outcomes," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 294-335, May.
    18. Richard McManus & F. Gulcin Ozkan, 2018. "Who does better for the economy? Presidents versus parliamentary democracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 361-387, September.
    19. Martin Halla & Mario Lackner & Johann Scharler, 2016. "Does the Welfare State Destroy the Family? Evidence from OECD Member Countries," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 118(2), pages 292-323, April.
    20. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini & Paolo Naticchioni, 2011. "Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 144-174, August.
    21. P. Dorian Owen, 2017. "Evaluating Ingenious Instruments for Fundamental Determinants of Long-Run Economic Growth and Development," Econometrics, MDPI, vol. 5(3), pages 1-33, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:58:y:2010:i:2:p:239-265. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0032-3217 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.