Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Which Democracies Pay Higher Wages?

Contents:

Author Info

  • James Rockey

    ()

  • Miltiadis Makris

    ()

Abstract

The labor share of income varies markedly across the set of democracies. A model of the political process, situated in a simple macroeconomic environment is analyzed in which the cause of this variation is linked to differences in the form of democracy - in particular the adoption of a presidential or parliamentary system. Presidential regimes are associated with lower taxation but lower wages. Robust evidence for the negative impact of a presidential system on the labor share is obtained using a Bayesian Model Averaging approach. Evidence is also provided that this is due to lower taxation.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/repec/lec/leecon/dp11-09.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 11/09.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:11/09

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK
Phone: +44 (0)116 252 2887
Fax: +44 (0)116 252 2908
Email:
Web page: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics/research/discussion-papers

Related research

Keywords: Fertility; Economic growth; Health expenditures;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Douglas Gollin, 2001. "Getting Income Shares Right," Department of Economics Working Papers 2001-11, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  2. Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 1998. "Lobbying and Legistlative Bargaining," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1837, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  3. Uwe Dulleck & Paul Frijters, 2004. "Why the US and not Brazil? Old Elites and the Development of a Modern Economy," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 186b, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
  4. Rockey, James, 2012. "Reconsidering the fiscal effects of constitutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 313-323.
  5. Lee, Myoung-jae, 2005. "Micro-Econometrics for Policy, Program and Treatment Effects," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199267699, Octomber.
  6. Jaroslava Hlouskova & Martin Wagner, 2005. "The Performance of Panel Unit Root and Stationarity Tests: Results from a Large Scale Simulation Study," Diskussionsschriften dp0503, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  7. Alberto Alesina & William Easterly & Janina Matuszeski, 2006. "Artificial States," NBER Working Papers 12328, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Gernot Doppelhofer & Ronald I. Miller & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2000. "Determinants of Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach," NBER Working Papers 7750, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Rodrik, Dani, 1998. "Democracies Pay Higher Wages," CEPR Discussion Papers 1776, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
  11. Adeel Malik & Jonathan R W Temple, 2005. "The Geography of Output Volatility," CSAE Working Paper Series 2005-07, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  12. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2000. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 7771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Gallup, J.L. & Sachs, J.D. & Mullinger, A., 1999. "Geography and Economic Development," Papers 1, Chicago - Graduate School of Business.
  14. Jonathan R. W. Temple, 1998. "Robustness tests of the augmented Solow model," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(4), pages 361-375.
  15. Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"," NBER Working Papers 11235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Hoeting, Jennifer & Raftery, Adrian E. & Madigan, David, 1996. "A method for simultaneous variable selection and outlier identification in linear regression," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 251-270, July.
  17. John Luke Gallup & Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Mellinger, 1999. "Geography and Economic Development," CID Working Papers 1, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:11/09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mrs. Alexandra Mazzuoccolo).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.