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The Political Economy of Group Membership

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  • Hansen, John Mark

Abstract

Despite its normative importance, the question of why people join interest groups remains open. It has certainly provoked a wealth of theoretical attention. Regrettably, however, it has inspired only a handful of empirical tests. The introduction of this article places the empirical debate into its normative context. The first section develops a rational model of individual evaluations of group membership, focusing upon the effect of changing personal circumstances—preferences, needs, resources, insecurity, and information—on the calculus. In particular, the theory predicts responsiveness to political or collective benefits in threatening times. Analyses of aggregate changes over time in membership in the Farm Bureau, the League of Women Voters, and the Home Builders, reported in the second section, bear the model out. Finally, the conclusion takes on the complementary question of group supply, sketching a theory of group mobilization that emphasizes subsidization.

Suggested Citation

  • Hansen, John Mark, 1985. "The Political Economy of Group Membership," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 79-96, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:01:p:79-96_22
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David Lowery & Virginia Gray, 2004. "Bias in the Heavenly Chorus," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 5-29, January.
    2. Barbieri, Stefano & Mattozzi, Andrea, 2009. "Membership in citizen groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 217-232, September.
    3. Thomas T. Holyoke, 2009. "Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 360-375, April.
    4. Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2009. "Campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-391, April.
    5. Patrick Dunleavy, 2010. "New Worlds in Political Science," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(2), pages 239-265, March.
    6. Robert Pahre, 1994. "Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 326-352, June.
    7. Grant Jordan & Darren Halpin, 2004. "Olson Triumphant? Recruitment Strategies and the Growth of a Small Business Organisation," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 52(3), pages 431-449, October.
    8. Bavorova, Miroslava & Curtiss, Jarmila, 2006. "What Motivates Farms to Associate? The Case of Two Competing Czech Agricultural Associations," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25770, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    9. William Hunter & Michael Nelson, 1989. "Interest group demand for taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 41-61, July.
    10. Robert Lowry, 1998. "Religion and the demand for membership in environmental citizen groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 223-240, March.
    11. Philip Jones, 2004. "‘All for One and One for All’: Transactions Cost and Collective Action," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 52(3), pages 450-468, October.

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