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Who does better for the economy? Presidents versus parliamentary democracies

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  • Richard McManus
  • F Gulcin Ozkan

Abstract

Are certain forms of government associated with superior macroeconomic performance? This paper attempts to answer this question by examining how government systems impact upon macroeconomic outcomes. We find that presidential regimes consistently produce less favourable outcomes as compared with parliamentary ones with lower output growth, higher and more volatile in ation and greater income inequality. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is sizable. For example, output growth is between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points lower and inflation is six percentage point higher under presidential regimes relative to those under parliamentary ones. The difference in distributional outcomes is even more stark; income inequality is between sixteen to twenty per cent worse under presidential systems. We also find that presidential regimes are particularly harmful in: less established democracies; where there is lack of inclusive institutions; where the rule of law is not fully respected; and, where the presidents have extensive legislative powers, especially in the presence of electoral systems with proportional representation.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard McManus & F Gulcin Ozkan, 2017. "Who does better for the economy? Presidents versus parliamentary democracies," Discussion Papers 17/03, Department of Economics, University of York.
  • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:17/03
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    Cited by:

    1. Carola Conces Binder, 2021. "Political Pressure on Central Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(4), pages 715-744, June.
    2. Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2021. "Direct and indirect influences of political regimes on corruption," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1569-1589, July.
    3. Ceyhun Elgin & Colin C. Williams & Gamze Oz‐Yalaman & Abdullan Yalaman, 2022. "Fiscal stimulus packages to COVID‐19: The role of informality," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(4), pages 861-879, May.
    4. Sutirtha Bagchi & Matthew J. Fagerstrom, 2023. "Wealth inequality and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 89-136, October.
    5. Neha B. Upadhayay, 2020. "Are only men fighting trade wars? Empirical evidence from the Temporary Trade Barriers (TTB) data," Erudite Working Paper 2020-03, Erudite.
    6. Neha Bhardwaj Upadhayay, 2020. "Uncovering the proliferation of contingent protection through channels of retaliation, gender and development assistance," Erudite Ph.D Dissertations, Erudite, number ph20-02 edited by Julie Lochard & Catherine Bros, December.
    7. Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2020. "Presidential Versus Parliamentary Systems: Where Do Female Entrepreneurs Thrive?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1773-1788, September.
    8. Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2023. "Which political regimes foster entrepreneurship? An international examination," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 126-146, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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