Quality of Government Services and the Civic Duty to Pay Taxes in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and other Transition Countries
AbstractCe papier analyse un sondage dans les Républiques Tchèque et Slovaque ainsi qu'un sondage plus limité en Hongrie et en Pologne et conclut que la fraude fiscale est la plus basse parmis ceux qui sont persuadés de recevoir des prestations gouvernementales de qualité pour les impôts qu'ils paient. Une augmentation de 20% de la qualité perçue des services du gouvernement pourrait mener à une baisse de 13 % de la fréquence de la fraude fiscale. Cette analyse est la première de son genre à démontrer une influence si vaste de la qualité des services gouvernementaux sur la complaisance fiscale. Les gouvernements des pays en transition qui souffrent d'un appareil défectif de collection d'impôts gagneraient à transmettre une information claire sur la qualité de leurs services afin de réduire l'évasion fiscale. Copyright WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG 2004.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 57 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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Other versions of this item:
- Jan Hanousek & Filip Palda, 2002. "Quality of Government Services and the Civic Duty to Pay Taxes in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and other Transition Countries," Public Economics 0209007, EconWPA.
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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