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Does capital structure differently affect incumbents' responses to entry threat and actual entry?

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  • Chao Ma

Abstract

Some theories predict that firms with higher financial leverage compete more aggressively in product markets than firms with lower financial leverage, whereas others predict that lower‐leverage firms compete more aggressively than higher‐leverage firms. This paper studies how incumbent airlines' capital structure affects their responses to Southwest Airlines' entry threat and actual entry. The results indicate that, when responding to entry threat, lower‐leverage incumbents cut prices more aggressively than higher‐leverage incumbents; in contrast, when responding to actual entry, higher‐leverage incumbents cut prices more aggressively than lower‐leverage incumbents.

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  • Chao Ma, 2019. "Does capital structure differently affect incumbents' responses to entry threat and actual entry?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 585-613, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:28:y:2019:i:4:p:585-613
    DOI: 10.1111/jems.12316
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    Cited by:

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    3. Myongjin Kim & Qi Ge & Donggeun Kim, 2021. "Mergers and labor market outcomes in the US airline industry," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 849-866, October.

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