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Parliament Shapes And Sizes

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  • Raphael Godefroy
  • Nicolas Klein

Abstract

This paper proposes a model of Parliamentary institutions in which a society makes three decisions behind the veil of ignorance: whether a Parliament should comprise one or two chambers, what the relative bargaining power of each chamber should be if the Parliament is bicameral, and how many legislators should sit in each chamber. We document empirical regularities across countries that are consistent with the predictions of our model. (JEL D71, D72)

Suggested Citation

  • Raphael Godefroy & Nicolas Klein, 2018. "Parliament Shapes And Sizes," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2212-2233, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:56:y:2018:i:4:p:2212-2233
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12584
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2023. "Which political regimes foster entrepreneurship? An international examination," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 126-146, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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