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A Theory Of Turnover And Wage Dynamics

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  • Jin Li
  • Jun Yu

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  • Jin Li & Jun Yu, 2017. "A Theory Of Turnover And Wage Dynamics," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 223-236, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:1:p:223-236
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecin.12384
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    6. Dan Bernhardt, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(2), pages 315-339.
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    9. George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 921-955.
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    16. Beaudry, Paul & DiNardo, John, 1991. "The Effect of Implicit Contracts on the Movement of Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 665-688, August.
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    18. Lisa B. Kahn, 2013. "Asymmetric Information between Employers," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 165-205, October.
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