IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/agecon/v51y2020i1p131-142.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Shenan Wu
  • Barry K. Goodwin
  • Keith Coble

Abstract

Along with adverse selection, moral hazard is one of the major hurdles that private and public insurance plans must contend with. Moral hazard occurs if risks are endogenous to a producer's behavior and if the insurer is unable to properly monitor the insured. We review the role of moral hazard in the US crop insurance program. We conduct an empirical analysis of one important aspect of the US crop insurance program—prevented planting. This provision provides indemnity payments if conditions are not suitable for planting. The program has been the subject of considerable controversy, especially during 2019, when the rate of claims is expected to be especially high. Because loss adjustors may encounter difficulties in assessing the weather conditions associated with prevented planting claims, the program is susceptible to moral hazard. We consider the extent to which prevented planting claims may be endogenous to prices. We find significant evidence of moral hazard. The likelihood of prevented planting claims increases as the expected market price decreases or as fertilizer costs increase for corn and soybeans in the Prairie Pothole Region and for grain sorghum and cotton in all states.

Suggested Citation

  • Shenan Wu & Barry K. Goodwin & Keith Coble, 2020. "Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 51(1), pages 131-142, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:agecon:v:51:y:2020:i:1:p:131-142
    DOI: 10.1111/agec.12545
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12545
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/agec.12545?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jesse B. Tack & David Ubilava, 2015. "Climate and agricultural risk: measuring the effect of ENSO on U.S. crop insurance," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 46(2), pages 245-257, March.
    2. Jisang Yu & Daniel A. Sumner, 2018. "Effects of subsidized crop insurance on crop choices," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 49(4), pages 533-545, July.
    3. Joshua D. Woodard & Philip Garcia, 2008. "Basis risk and weather hedging effectiveness," Agricultural Finance Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 68(1), pages 99-117, May.
    4. Zaura Fadhliani & Jeff Luckstead & Eric J. Wailes, 2019. "The impacts of multiperil crop insurance on Indonesian rice farmers and production," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 50(1), pages 15-26, January.
    5. Wolfram Schlenker & Michael J. Roberts, 2006. "Nonlinear Effects of Weather on Corn Yields ," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 28(3), pages 391-398.
    6. Rejesus, Roderick M. & Lovell, Ashley C. & Little, Bertis B. & Cross, Mike H., 2003. "Determinants of Anomalous Prevented Planting Claims: Theory and Evidence from Crop Insurance," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 32(2), pages 1-15, October.
    7. Yufei Jin & Roderick Rejesus & Bertis Little, 2005. "Binary choice models for rare events data: a crop insurance fraud application," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(7), pages 841-848.
    8. Quiggin, John C. & Karagiannis, Giannis & Stanton, J., 1993. "Crop Insurance And Crop Production: An Empirical Study Of Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 37(2), pages 1-19, August.
    9. Vincent H. Smith & Barry K. Goodwin, 1996. "Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Agricultural Chemical Use," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(2), pages 428-438.
    10. Taehoo Kim & Man‐Keun Kim, 2018. "Ex‐post moral hazard in prevented planting," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 49(6), pages 671-680, November.
    11. Martin, Steven W. & Barnett, Barry J. & Coble, Keith H., 2001. "Developing And Pricing Precipitation Insurance," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 26(1), pages 1-14, July.
    12. Kristin H. Roll, 2019. "Moral hazard: the effect of insurance on risk and efficiency," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 50(3), pages 367-375, May.
    13. Jisang Yu & Aaron Smith & Daniel A Sumner, 2018. "Effects of Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies on Crop Acreage," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 100(1), pages 91-114.
    14. Keith H. Coble & Thomas O. Knight & Rulon D. Pope & Jeffery R. Williams, 1997. "An Expected-Indemnity Approach to the Measurement of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(1), pages 216-226.
    15. Vedenov, Dmitry V. & Barnett, Barry J., 2004. "Efficiency of Weather Derivatives as Primary Crop Insurance Instruments," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 1-17, December.
    16. Calum G. Turvey, 2001. "Weather Derivatives for Specific Event Risks in Agriculture," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 23(2), pages 333-351.
    17. Roderick M. Rejesus & Cesar L. Escalante & Ashley C. Lovell, 2005. "Share Tenancy, Ownership Structure, and Prevented Planting Claims in Crop Insurance," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(1), pages 180-193.
    18. Jesse Tack & Keith Coble & Barry Barnett, 2018. "Warming temperatures will likely induce higher premium rates and government outlays for the U.S. crop insurance program," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 49(5), pages 635-647, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hui Mao & Shaojian Chen & RuiYao Ying & Yong Fu, 2023. "How crop insurance influences agrochemical input use: Evidence from cotton farmers in China," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 67(2), pages 224-244, April.
    2. Paloch Suchato & Taro Mieno & Karina Schoengold & Timothy Foster, 2022. "The potential for moral hazard behavior in irrigation decisions under crop insurance," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 53(2), pages 257-273, March.
    3. Boyer, Christopher N. & Park, Eunchun & Smith, Aaron & Maples, William E. & Hellwinckel, Chad, 2023. "Prevented Planting Coverage Factor Analysis," 2023 Annual Meeting, July 23-25, Washington D.C. 335430, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. Lee, Seunghyun, 2022. "Effects of Wet Spring on Prevented Planting," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322348, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Ruggiero Rippo & Simone Cerroni, 2023. "Farmers' participation in the Income Stabilisation Tool: Evidence from the apple sector in Italy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 273-294, February.
    6. Prasenjit N. Ghosh & Ruiqing Miao & Emir Malikov, 2023. "Crop insurance premium subsidy and irrigation water withdrawals in the western United States," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 48(4), pages 968-992, October.
    7. Marco Rogna & Günter Schamel & Alex Weissensteiner, 2023. "Modelling the switch from hail insurance to antihail nets," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 67(1), pages 118-136, January.
    8. Nicole Karwowski, 2022. "Estimating the Effect of Easements on Agricultural Production," NBER Chapters, in: American Agriculture, Water Resources, and Climate Change, pages 53-105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tao Li & Lihong Chen & Xiaoxu Li & Sha Li & Haibing Chen & Hao Ji, 2021. "The Impact of Cost-of-Production Insurance on Input Expense of Fruit Growing in Ecologically Vulnerable Areas: Evidence from Shaanxi Province of China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(21), pages 1-14, November.
    2. Juan He & Xiaoyong Zheng & Roderick Rejesus & Jose Yorobe, 2020. "Input use under cost‐of‐production crop insurance: Theory and evidence," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 51(3), pages 343-357, May.
    3. Andrea Martínez Salgueiro & Maria-Antonia Tarrazon-Rodon, 2020. "Approaching rainfall-based weather derivatives pricing and operational challenges," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 163-190, July.
    4. Barnett, Barry J. & Barrett, Christopher B. & Skees, Jerry R., 2008. "Poverty Traps and Index-Based Risk Transfer Products," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1766-1785, October.
    5. Paloch Suchato & Taro Mieno & Karina Schoengold & Timothy Foster, 2022. "The potential for moral hazard behavior in irrigation decisions under crop insurance," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 53(2), pages 257-273, March.
    6. Barnett, Barry J., 2004. "Agricultural Index Insurance Products: Strengths And Limitations," Agricultural Outlook Forum 2004 32971, United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Outlook Forum.
    7. Jianru Fu & Ruiyuan Shen & Chao Huang, 2023. "How does price insurance alleviate the fluctuation of agricultural product market? A dynamic analysis based on cobweb model," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 69(5), pages 202-211.
    8. Deng, Xiaohui & Barnett, Barry J. & Yu, Yingzhuo & Hoogenboom, Gerrit & Garcia, Axel Garcia y, 2008. "Alternative Crop Insurance Indexes," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 223-237, April.
    9. Raucci, Gian Lucca & Silveira, Rodrigo Lanna F. & Capitani, Daniel H D, 2018. "Development Of Weather Derivatives: Evidence From Brazilian Soybean Market," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274105, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    10. Schmidt, Lorenz & Odening, Martin & Schlanstein, Johann & Ritter, Matthias, 2021. "Estimation of the Farm-Level Yield-Weather-Relation Using Machine Learning," 61st Annual Conference, Berlin, Germany, September 22-24, 2021 317075, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    11. Möhring, Niklas & Dalhaus, Tobias & Enjolras, Geoffroy & Finger, Robert, 2020. "Crop insurance and pesticide use in European agriculture," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    12. Ghahremanzadeh, Mohammad & Mohammadrezaei, Rassul & Dashti, Ghader & Ainollahi, Moharram, 2018. "Designing a whole-farm revenue insurance for agricultural crops in Zanjan province of Iran," Economia Agraria y Recursos Naturales, Spanish Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 17(02), January.
    13. Deng, Xiaohui & Barnett, Barry J. & Hoogenboom, Gerrit & Yu, Yingzhuo & Garcia, Axel, 2006. "Evaluating the Efficiency of Crop Index Insurance Products," 2006 Annual Meeting, February 5-8, 2006, Orlando, Florida 35333, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    14. Taehoo Kim & Man‐Keun Kim, 2018. "Ex‐post moral hazard in prevented planting," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 49(6), pages 671-680, November.
    15. Jisang Yu & Nathan P. Hendricks, 2020. "Input Use Decisions with Greater Information on Crop Conditions: Implications for Insurance Moral Hazard and the Environment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(3), pages 826-845, May.
    16. Bucheli, Janic & Dalhaus, Tobias & Finger, Robert, 2022. "Temperature effects on crop yields in heat index insurance," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    17. Buchholz, Matthias & Musshoff, Oliver, 2014. "The role of weather derivatives and portfolio effects in agricultural water management," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 34-44.
    18. Turvey, Calum G. & Norton, Michael, 2008. "An Internet-Based Tool for Weather Risk Management," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 63-78, April.
    19. Zhiwei Shen & Martin Odening, 2013. "Coping with systemic risk in index-based crop insurance," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 44(1), pages 1-13, January.
    20. Erich Seamon & Paul E. Gessler & John T. Abatzoglou & Philip W. Mote & Stephen S. Lee, 2023. "Climatic Damage Cause Variations of Agricultural Insurance Loss for the Pacific Northwest Region of the United States," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-13, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:agecon:v:51:y:2020:i:1:p:131-142. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iaaeeea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.