The Bargaining Strength of a Milk Marketing Cooperative
AbstractAs a result of economies of size, food processors are generally large and few in number. These characteristics put processors at a bargaining advantage over independent farmers. Marketing cooperatives were established to counter the uneven bargaining position of individual farmers. This article investigates the relative bargaining strength of one milk marketing cooperative and several fluid milk processors. The Nash bargaining model can be used to analyze the negotiated price in the Florida fluid milk market which acts like a bilateral monopoly. The milk marketing cooperatives have bargained well with the milk marketing processors. The monthly bargaining strength of the Southeast Dairy Cooperative, Inc. (SDC), exceeds the monthly bargaining strength of the processors in all twelve months, ranging from a low of 0.6664 in January to a high of 0.7831 in September. The monthly average bargaining strength across all months for SDC is 0.7326.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association in its journal Agricultural and Resource Economics Review.
Volume (Year): 37 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
cooperative; bargaining; bilateral monopoly; dairy; processors; Agribusiness; Marketing;
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- Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets," Research Reports 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, December.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
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- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Cai, Xiaowei & Stiegert, Kyle W., 2012. "Economic Analysis of the U.S. Fluid Milk Industry," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124939, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
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