Incentives in merchant empires: Portuguese and Dutch compensation schemes
AbstractThe Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires had a similar geographic distribution with outposts all around the Indian Ocean, which they controlled and manned. Both empires faced the same problem of monitoring their agents in remote corners of the world. Each, however, arrived at a different solution to the monitoring problem. I use a principal–agent model to link different monitoring options to the different organizational structures of the two empires. I further investigate the implications of the model with archival data on labor compensation for Portuguese and Dutch workers overseas.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC) in its journal Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History.
Volume (Year): 7 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Merchant empires; Labor compensation; Monitoring;
Other versions of this item:
- Claudia Rei, 2011. "Incentives in Merchant Empires: Portuguese and Dutch Compensation Schemes," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1112, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- N33 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: Pre-1913
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