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Incentives in Merchant Empires: Portuguese and Dutch Labor Compensation

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  • Rei, Claudia

Abstract

The different organizational structure of the Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires affected their ability to monitor workers. I test the theoretical implications of these differences using micro data of overseas workers' compensation from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The two merchant empires used significantly different compensation structures: working for the king of Portugal corresponded to a higher bonus share of compensation on average than that of the Dutch East India Company. These results are consistent with theoretical implications and provide additional support to the historical evidence we have on the organizational structure of merchant empires.

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  • Rei, Claudia, 2011. "Incentives in Merchant Empires: Portuguese and Dutch Labor Compensation," MPRA Paper 28712, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28712
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Claude Rei, 2014. "Careers and wages in the Dutch East India Company," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 8(1), pages 27-48, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Merchant Empires; Labor Compensation; Incentives; Monitoring;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N34 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: 1913-
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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