Incentives in Merchant Empires: Portuguese and Dutch Labor Compensation
AbstractThe different organizational structure of the Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires affected their ability to monitor workers. I test the theoretical implications of these differences using micro data of overseas workers' compensation from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The two merchant empires used significantly different compensation structures: working for the king of Portugal corresponded to a higher bonus share of compensation on average than that of the Dutch East India Company. These results are consistent with theoretical implications and provide additional support to the historical evidence we have on the organizational structure of merchant empires.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28712.
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Merchant Empires; Labor Compensation; Incentives; Monitoring;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- N34 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: 1913-
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-HIS-2011-02-19 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-HRM-2011-02-19 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2011-02-19 (Labour Economics)
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