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Incentives in Merchant Empires: Portuguese and Dutch Labor Compensation

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  • Rei, Claudia

Abstract

The different organizational structure of the Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires affected their ability to monitor workers. I test the theoretical implications of these differences using micro data of overseas workers' compensation from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The two merchant empires used significantly different compensation structures: working for the king of Portugal corresponded to a higher bonus share of compensation on average than that of the Dutch East India Company. These results are consistent with theoretical implications and provide additional support to the historical evidence we have on the organizational structure of merchant empires.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28712.

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Date of creation: Jan 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28712

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Keywords: Merchant Empires; Labor Compensation; Incentives; Monitoring;

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Cited by:
  1. Claudia Rei, 2011. "Turning Points in Leadership: Shipping Technology in the Portuguese and Dutch Merchant Empires," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1123, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  2. Claude Rei, 2014. "Careers and wages in the Dutch East India Company," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 8(1), pages 27-48, January.

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