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Investing in Skill and Searching for Coworkers: Endogenous Participation in a Matching Market

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  • Chris Bidner
  • Guillaume Roger
  • Jessica Moses

Abstract

We demonstrate how search frictions have important yet subtle implications for participation in a skilled labor market by studying a model in which agents invest in skill prior to searching for coworkers. Search frictions induce the existence of acceptance-constrained equilibria, whereby matching concerns—as opposed to investment costs—dissuade the marginal agent from investing and participating in the skilled matching market. Such equilibria are robust, relevant, and have comparative static properties that contrast sharply with the intuitive properties arising in a benchmark static setting. We consider an extension with separate matching "marketplaces," and show that our main results continue to hold. (JEL C78, D83, J24)

Suggested Citation

  • Chris Bidner & Guillaume Roger & Jessica Moses, 2016. "Investing in Skill and Searching for Coworkers: Endogenous Participation in a Matching Market," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 166-202, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:8:y:2016:i:1:p:166-202
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140110
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    1. Chris Bidner & John Knowles, 2018. "Matching for Social Mobility with Unobserved Heritable Characteristics," Discussion Papers dp18-05, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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