Transplants and Implants: The Economics of Self-Improvement
AbstractThis article examines equilibrium self-improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two-sided search model with nontransferable utility. Singles are vertically differentiated--some make better marriage partners than others. A complete characterization of equilibrium is provided. It is shown there are two externalities to self-improvement decisions. Further, these externalities may support multiple Pareto rankable equilibria. By encouraging everybody to self-improve, society can create a situation where everybody is forced to improve to remain "acceptable." But a preferred equilibrium may exist where there is less (costly) self-improvement.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 42 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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- Bhaskar, V. & Hopkins, Ed, 2011.
"Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching,"
SIRE Discussion Papers
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