Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 89 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
- Felix VÃ¡rdy & John Morgan, 2005.
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"The struggle over migration policy,"
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- Alexander Matros, 2004. "Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 295, Econometric Society.
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"Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany
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- P.-J. Jost & M. KrÃ¤kel, 2005. "Preemptive behavior in sequential-move tournaments with heterogeneous agents," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 245-252, November.
- Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Contests with multiple rounds," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 213-227, April.
- Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
- ISKAKOV, Mikhail & ISKAKOV, Alexey & ZAKHAROV, Alexey, 2014. "Equilibria in secure strategies in the Tullock contest," CORE Discussion Papers, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2014010, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Blavatskyy, Pavlo R., 2010. "Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 267-276, March.
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