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Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment

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  • Onsong Shin
  • Michael R. Baye

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.89.3.691
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 89 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 691-693

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:3:p:691-693

Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.3.691
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  1. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
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Cited by:
  1. P.-J. Jost & M. Kräkel, 2005. "Preemptive behavior in sequential-move tournaments with heterogeneous agents," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 245-252, November.
  2. Alex Possajennikov, . "Commitment in Symmetric Contests," Discussion Papers 08/13, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
  3. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2000. "Strategic Restraint in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 271, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Contests with multiple rounds," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 213-227, April.
  5. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Magnus HOFFMANN, 2010. "Endogenous Timing in General Rent‐Seeking and Conflict Models," Working Papers 201024, CERDI.
  6. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Elimination Tournaments where Players Have Fixed Resources," Working Papers 205, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006.
  7. Morgan, John & Várdy, Felix, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt0s6752rf, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  8. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2005. "The Struggle over Migration Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 1533, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Alexander Matros, 2004. "Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments," 2004 Meeting Papers 616, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.

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