Commitment in Symmetric Contests
AbstractThe paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player's payoff for any number of players.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Nottingham, School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 08/13.
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Other versions of this item:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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- Alex Possajennikov, 2008.
"On the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior and Delegation in Contests,"
2008-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Alex Possajennikov, 2008. "On the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior and Delegation in Contests," Discussion Papers 2008-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
- Matthias Kräkel, 2002. "Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(8), pages 461-470.
- Onsong Shin & Michael R. Baye, 1999. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 691-693, June.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
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