Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
AbstractOrgan donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration. (JEL C91, D64, I11)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 102 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 (August)
Other versions of this item:
- Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, 2011. "Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate," NBER Working Papers 17324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
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