Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Kidneys For Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Roth, Alvin E.
  • Leider, Stephen

Abstract

The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess disapproval for several forms of kidney market, and to understand why individuals disapprove by identifying factors that predict disapproval, including disapproval of markets for other body parts, dislike of increased scope for markets, and distrust of markets generally. Our results suggest that while the public is potentially receptive to compensating kidney donors, among those who oppose it, general disapproval towards certain kinds of transactions is at least as important as concern about specific policy details. Between 51% and 63% of respondents approve of the various potential kidney markets we investigate, and between 42% and 58% want such markets to be legal. 38% of respondents disapprove of at least one market. Respondents who distrust markets generally are \(not\) more disapproving of kidney markets; however we find significant correlations between kidney market disapproval and attitudes reflecting disapproval towards certain transactions – including both other body markets and market encroachment into traditionally non-market exchanges, such as food preparation.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/5128483/Roth_Kidneys.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 5128483.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in American Journal of Transplantation
Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:5128483

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138
Phone: 617-495-2144
Fax: 617-495-7730
Web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0308002, EconWPA.
  2. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, 2011. "Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate," NBER Working Papers 17324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Roth, Alvin E. & Ashlagi, Itai, 0. "Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  3. Lacetera, Nicola & Macis, Mario & Stith, Sarah S., 2012. "Removing Financial Barriers to Organ and Bone Marrow Donation: The Effect of Leave and Tax Legislation in the U.S," IZA Discussion Papers 6814, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. van Dalen, Hendrik P. & Henkens, Kène, 2014. "Comparing the effects of defaults in organ donation systems," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 137-142.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:5128483. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ben Steinberg).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.