Content
August 2009, Volume 1, Issue 2
- 148-167 A "Dual Self" Representation for Stochastic Temptation
by Kalyan Chatterjee & R. Vijay Krishna - 168-198 Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach
by Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu - 199-219 Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
by Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth - 220-242 Corruptible Advice
by Erik Durbin & Ganesh Iyer
February 2009, Volume 1, Issue 1
- 1-1 Editor's Note
by Andrew Postlewaite - 1-16 Assessing Strategic Risk
by R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze - 17-52 Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets
by Attila Ambrus & Rossella Argenziano - 53-74 The Geography of Trade in Online Transactions: Evidence from eBay and MercadoLibre
by Ali Hortaçsu & F. Asís Martínez-Jerez & Jason Douglas - 75-100 Contracting with Third Parties
by Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström - 101-123 Moral Hazard and Customer Loyalty Programs
by Leonardo J. Basso & Matthew T. Clements & Thomas W. Ross - 124-150 Like Father, Like Son: Social Network Externalities and Parent-Child Correlation in Behavior
by Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Matthew O. Jackson - 151-181 The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory
by Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas R. Palfrey - 182-206 Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types
by Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel - 207-236 The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study
by Gary Charness & Dan Levin - 237-267 Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene
by Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie
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