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On Information Design in Games

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  2. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Interactive Information Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
  4. Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023. "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  5. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  6. Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2021. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 112, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  7. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  8. Toygar T. Kerman & P. Jean‐Jacques Herings & Dominik Karos, 2024. "Persuading sincere and strategic voters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(1), February.
  9. Toygar T. Kerman & Anastas P. Tenev & Konstantin Zabarnyi, 2025. "Persuasion Gains and Losses from Peer Communication," Papers 2509.09099, arXiv.org.
  10. Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2023. "LQG Information Design," Papers 2312.09479, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
  11. Toygar T. Kerman & Anastas P. Tenev, 2024. "Pitfalls of Information Spillovers in Persuasion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp772, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  12. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric & Salamanca, Andrés, 2024. "Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
  13. Frédéric Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2025. "Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(3), pages 2157-2174, August.
  14. Hedlund, Jonas & Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2024. "Contagion management through information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
  15. Rivera Mora, Ernesto, 2024. "Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  16. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
  17. Sato, Hiroto & Shirakawa, Ryo, 2025. "Information structures in college admissions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
  18. Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2025. "Information Design and Full Implementation in Nonatomic Games," Papers 2502.05920, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
  19. Zhicheng Du & Wei Tang & Zihe Wang & Shuo Zhang, 2025. "Optimal Calibrated Signaling in Digital Auctions," Papers 2507.17187, arXiv.org.
  20. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
    • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  21. Kuang, Zhonghong & Zhao, Hangcheng & Zheng, Jie, 2024. "Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 218-243.
  22. Stäbler, Jonathan, 2025. "Disclosure policy in contests with sabotage and group size uncertainty," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
  23. Inostroza, Nicolas A. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2025. "Adversarial coordination and public information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(2), May.
  24. Bardhi, Arjada & Guo, Yingni, 2018. "Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.
  25. Roweno J. R. K. Heijmans, 2023. "Unraveling Coordination Problems," Papers 2307.08557, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  26. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Dominik Karos & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Belief inducibility and informativeness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(4), pages 517-553, June.
  27. Furkan Sezer, 2026. "Markov Information Processes," Papers 2607.04308, arXiv.org.
  28. Lillethun, Erik, 2026. "Information design and reputations in the frequent-interaction limit," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  29. Vives, Xavier & Vravosinos, Orestis, 2024. "Strategic complementarity in games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
  30. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2023. "Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions," Papers 2307.07672, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
  31. Furkan Sezer, 2026. "Continuous-Time Information-Mechanism Control," Papers 2606.24015, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2026.
  32. Li, Xuelin & Szydlowski, Martin & Yu, Fangyuan, 2025. "Dynamic information design in an entry game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  33. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  34. Feng, Xin, 2020. "Information disclosure on the contest mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 148-156.
  35. repec:upd:utmpwp:018 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2023. "Informed Information Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(11), pages 3186-3232.
  37. Alonso, Ricardo & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2024. "Persuading large investors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  38. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," Post-Print hal-03700394, HAL.
  39. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
  40. Kevin He & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Omer Tamuz, 2026. "Private Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 134(5), pages 1561-1606.
  41. Tomala, Tristan & Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie, 2018. "Interactive Information Design," HEC Research Papers Series 1260, HEC Paris, revised 02 May 2018.
  42. Hiroto Sato, 2023. "Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 269-285, June.
  43. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03700394, HAL.
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