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On Information Design in Games

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
  2. Roweno J. R. K. Heijmans, 2023. "Unraveling Coordination Problems," Papers 2307.08557, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  3. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Interactive Information Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
  4. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  5. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Dominik Karos & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Belief inducibility and informativeness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(4), pages 517-553, June.
  6. Vives, Xavier & Vravosinos, Orestis, 2024. "Strategic complementarity in games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
  7. Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023. "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  8. Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2023. "Informed Information Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(11), pages 3186-3232.
  9. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2021. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 112, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  11. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2023. "Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions," Papers 2307.07672, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
  12. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  13. Toygar T. Kerman & P. Jean‐Jacques Herings & Dominik Karos, 2024. "Persuading sincere and strategic voters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(1), February.
  14. Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2023. "LQG Information Design," Papers 2312.09479, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
  15. Kevin He & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Omer Tamuz, 2021. "Private Private Information," Papers 2112.14356, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2025.
  16. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric & Salamanca, Andrés, 2024. "Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
  17. Toygar T. Kerman & Anastas P. Tenev, 2024. "Pitfalls of Information Spillovers in Persuasion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp772, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  18. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  19. Feng, Xin, 2020. "Information disclosure on the contest mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 148-156.
  20. repec:upd:utmpwp:018 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games," Papers 2107.06312, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
  22. Hedlund, Jonas & Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2024. "Contagion management through information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
  23. Rivera Mora, Ernesto, 2024. "Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  24. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
  25. Alonso, Ricardo & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2024. "Persuading large investors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 126040, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  26. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," Post-Print hal-03700394, HAL.
  27. Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2025. "Full Implementation via Information Design in Nonatomic Games," Papers 2502.05920, arXiv.org.
  28. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
  29. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
    • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  30. Kuang, Zhonghong & Zhao, Hangcheng & Zheng, Jie, 2024. "Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 218-243.
  31. Inostroza, Nicolas A. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2025. "Adversarial coordination and public information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(2), May.
  32. Bardhi, Arjada & Guo, Yingni, 2018. "Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.
  33. Tomala, Tristan & Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie, 2018. "Interactive Information Design," HEC Research Papers Series 1260, HEC Paris, revised 02 May 2018.
  34. Hiroto Sato, 2023. "Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 269-285, June.
  35. Alonso, Ricardo & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2024. "Persuading large investors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  36. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03700394, HAL.
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