IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/ucp/jpolec/doi10.1086-704074.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Felipe Arteaga & Adam J Kapor & Christopher A Neilson & Seth D Zimmerman, 2022. "Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(3), pages 1791-1848.
  2. Vincent Meisner & Pascal Pillath, 2025. "Monetizing Digital Content with Network Effects," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 541, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  3. Justus Haucap, 2020. "Nobelpreis für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom: Zwei Ökonomen, die echte Märkte schufen [Nobel Prize for Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom: Two Economists who Created Real Markets]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 100(12), pages 969-975, December.
  4. Hai Nguyen & Thành Nguyen & Alexander Teytelboym, 2021. "Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7438-7454, December.
  5. Kevin Leyton-Brown & Paul Milgrom & Neil Newman & Ilya Segal, 2024. "Artificial Intelligence and Market Design: Lessons Learned from Radio Spectrum Reallocation," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Hafalir, Isa E. & Kojima, Fuhito & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2022. "Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  7. Billy A. Ferguson & Paul Milgrom, 2024. "Market Design for Surface Water," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Fanqi Shi & Yiqing Xing, 2022. "Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 703-732, December.
  9. Neil Newman & Kevin Leyton-Brown & Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2024. "Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(11), pages 8187-8215, November.
  10. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 1-15.
  11. Goutham Takasi & Milind Dawande & Ganesh Janakiraman, 2023. "Optimal cardinal contests," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(11), pages 3433-3451, November.
  12. Ravi Jagadeesan & Alexander Teytelboym, 2024. "The Economics of Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods," Papers 2412.07946, arXiv.org.
  13. Eric Budish & Judd B. Kessler, 2022. "Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1107-1130, February.
  14. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  15. Ryuji Sano, 2021. "Dynamic communication mechanism design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 163-180, July.
  16. van Basshuysen, Philippe, 2023. "Markets, market algorithms, and algorithmic bias," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115694, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  17. Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2023. "Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/02, Department of Economics, University of York.
  18. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
  19. Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer & Thibaud Vergé, 2021. "Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration," CESifo Working Paper Series 8971, CESifo.
  20. Deng, Shanglyu, 2023. "Speculation in procurement auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  21. Andreas Haupt & Zoe Hitzig, 2021. "Contextually Private Mechanisms," Papers 2112.10812, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
  22. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  23. Shengwu Li, 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 38(4), pages 175-192, Fall.
  24. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
  25. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2022. "Tract Housing, The Core, And Pendulum Auctions," Discussion papers e-22-005, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
  26. Malik, Komal & Mishra, Debasis, 2021. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
  27. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2023. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 68-90.
  28. Yu, Hao & Huang, Min & Song, Yang & Wang, Xingwei & Yue, Xiaohang, 2025. "Making the most of your private parking slot: Strategy-proof double auctions-enabled staggered sharing schemes," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
  29. Christopher Neilson & Felipe Arteaga & Adam Kapor & Seth Zimmerman, 2021. "Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School ChoiceSmart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice," Working Papers 650, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.