The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies
Citations
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Cited by:
- Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa, 2020. "A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1129-1142, December.
- Kimmo Berg & Gijs Schoenmakers, 2017. "Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-14, November.
- Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2016. "Bounded memory Folk Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 728-774.
- L. Petrosjan & J. Puerto, 2002. "Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated N-person games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 10(2), pages 275-287, December.
- Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011.
"Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
- Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10073, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Post-Print halshs-00524134, HAL.
- Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00524134, HAL.
- Marlats, Chantal, 2019. "Perturbed finitely repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 39-46.
- Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2013. "Finitely repeated games with monitoring options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1929-1952.
- GOSSNER, Olivier & TOMALA, Tristan, 2003. "Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Carmona, G. & Sabourian, H., 2021. "Approachability with Discounting," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2124, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/6885 is not listed on IDEAS
- Olivier Gossner, 1997. "Protocoles de communication robustes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 685-695.
- Chantal Marlats, 2015. "A Folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 485-507, April.
- Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
- Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 1996.
"The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis,"
Discussion Papers
96-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1999. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information 9902001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1996. "The Folk Theorems For Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Working Papers 96-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Benoit, J.P. & Krishna, V., 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Papers 1-96-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information 9601001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hörner, Johannes & Renault, Jérôme, 2023. "A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring," TSE Working Papers 23-1473, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2006. "Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 100-111, April.
- repec:kbb:dpaper:2011-44 is not listed on IDEAS
- Olivier GOSSNER, 2020. "The Robustness of Incomplete Penal Codes in Repeated Interactions," Working Papers 2020-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Johannes Hörner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2015.
"Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 1795-1848, September.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2015.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2014. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000881, David K. Levine.
- Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 2001. "Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 563-579, July.
- Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008.
"Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
- Marco Scarsini & Sergio Scarlatti & Jérôme Renault, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Post-Print hal-00365583, HAL.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2016.
"How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 332-359.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi, 2016. "How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2029, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2017. "How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games?," TSE Working Papers 17-792, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2016. "Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring," Discussion Papers 2016-12, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
- Daehyun Kim & Xiaoxi Li, 2022. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(2), pages 1631-1647, May.
- Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2020. "Myopic perception in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-14.
- Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," KRTK-KTI WORKING PAPERS 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Bo Chen & Satoru Fujishige, 2013. "On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 295-303, February.
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