Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated N-person games
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Volume (Year): 10 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July.
- Gossner, Olivier, 1995. "The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 95-107.
- repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-80679 is not listed on IDEAS
- Borm, P.E.M. & van Megen, F.J.C. & Tijs, S.H., 1999. "A perfectness concept for multicriteria games," Other publications TiSEM 322bd1a7-90e0-400d-b167-6, School of Economics and Management.
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