IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/pubeco/v134y2016icp85-99.html

Hierarchical accountability in government

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Charles M. Cameron & John M. de Figueiredo & David E. Lewis, 2016. "Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off," NBER Working Papers 22966, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Michela Cella & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni, 2017. "Do the Right Thing: Incentives for Policy Selection in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(335), pages 430-453, July.
  3. Graziano Abrate & Federico Boffa & Fabrizio Erbetta & Davide Vannoni, 2013. "Corruption, Accountability and Efficiency. An Application to Municipal Solid Waste Services," Working papers 022, Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
  4. Gergely Ujhelyi, 2014. "Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 338-380, May.
  5. Nan Gao & Pinghan Liang & Lixin Colin Xu, 2021. "Power struggle and pork barrel politics in authoritarian countries: Evidence from China," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(1), pages 123-150, January.
  6. Zohal Hessami & Timo Häcker & Maximilian Thomas, 2025. "Public administrators as politicians in office," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 32(6), pages 1960-1987, December.
  7. Alexander Whalley, 2013. "Elected versus Appointed Policy Makers: Evidence from City Treasurers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(1), pages 39-81.
  8. Benedict S. Jimenez & Laiyang Ke & Minji Hong, 2025. "Mayoral partisanship and municipal fiscal health," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 203(1), pages 157-181, April.
  9. Jean Guillaume Forand & Gergely Ujhelyi & Michael M Ting, 2023. "Bureaucrats and Policies in Equilibrium Administrations," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 815-863.
  10. Raymond Fisman & Aron Malatinszky & Eyub Yegen, 2026. "Electoral Incentives and Government Transparency: Evidence from Freedom of Information Requests," NBER Working Papers 35248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Farah, Alfa, 2019. "Winning a district election in a clientelistic society: Evidence from decentralized Indonesia," CIW Discussion Papers 2/2019, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
  12. Sasso, Greg & Morelli, Massimo, 2021. "Bureaucrats under Populism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
  13. Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2017. "A köztisztviselői törvények hatása a kormányzati kiadásokra [The effects of civil-service legislation on government spending]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 885-914.
  14. Michela Cella & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni, 2014. "Constitutional Rules and Efficient Policies," Working Papers 270, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2014.
  15. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2026. "Democratic Accountability with Citizen Coproduction," OSF Preprints gehwz_v2, Center for Open Science.
  16. Yazaki, Yukihiro, 2018. "The effects of bureaucracy on political accountability and electoral selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 57-68.
  17. Elliott Ash & Massimo Morelli & Richard Van Weelden, 2015. "Elections and Divisiveness: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 21422, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.
  19. Graziano Abrate & Federico Boffa & Fabrizio Erbetta & Davide Vannoni, 2018. "Voters’ Information, Corruption, and the Efficiency of Local Public Services," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(12), pages 1-22, December.
  20. S. Borağan Aruoba & Allan Drazen & Razvan Vlaicu, 2019. "A Structural Model Of Electoral Accountability," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(2), pages 517-545, May.
  21. Foerster, Manuel & Voss, Achim, 2022. "Believe me, I am ignorant, but not biased," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
  22. Christopher Li, 2021. "Indirect accountability of political appointees," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(3), pages 383-396, July.
  23. Edward L. Glaeser, 2012. "Urban Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 18244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Zohal Hessami, 2018. "Accountability and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 100(1), pages 51-64, March.
  25. Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2014. "Civil service reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 15-25.
  26. Simon Lodato & Christos Mavridis & Federico Vaccari, 2024. "The Unelected Hand? Bureaucratic Influence and Electoral Accountability," Papers 2402.17526, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2025.
  27. Claire S.H. Lim & James M. Snyder Jr., 2021. "What Shapes the Quality and Behavior of Government Officials? Institutional Variation in Selection and Retention Methods," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 87-109, August.
  28. Akitaka Kamijo, 2026. "Indirect executive accountability of prime ministers," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 38(1), pages 28-55, January.
  29. Li, Christopher M. & Sasso, Greg & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Managing Government Hierarchy: Electoral Turnover and Intra-Governmental Cooperation," SocArXiv xuvjc, Center for Open Science.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.