Productive versus destructive efforts in contests

Citations

Cited by:

1. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2019. "Quantity-cum-quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 289-297.
   • J. Atsu Amegashie, 2018. "Quantity-cum-Quality Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 7110, CESifo.
2. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
3. St-Pierre, Marc, 2016. "The role of inequality on effort in tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 38-52.
4. Miettinen, Topi & Poutvaara, Panu, 2014. "A market for connections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 37-52.
   • Topi Miettinen & Panu Poutvaara, 2012. "A Market for Connections," CESifo Working Paper Series 3810, CESifo.
   • Miettinen, Topi & Poutvaara, Panu, 2014. "A market for connections," Munich Reprints in Economics 19202, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
5. repec:elg:eechap:15325_3 is not listed on IDEAS
6. Clark, Derek J. & Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore, 2025. "Investment and endogenous efficiency in a contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
7. Doğan, Serhat & Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2021. "Bribing in team contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-9.
   • Serhat Dogan & Emin Karagözoglu & Kerim Keskin & Cagri Saglam, 2020. "Bribing in Team Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 8096, CESifo.
8. Kräkel, Matthias & Nieken, Petra & Przemeck, Judith, 2014. "Risk taking and investing in electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 98-120.
   • Kräkel, Matthias & Nieken, Petra & Przemeck, Judith, 2008. "Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 233, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   • Kräkel, Matthias & Nieken, Petra & Przemeck, Judith, 2008. "Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 7/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
9. Kyung Hwan Baik & Dongwoo Lee, 2025. "Sabotage and Free Riding in Contests With a Group‐Specific Public Good/Bad Prize," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 27(6), December.
   • Kyung Hwan Baik & Dongwoo Lee, 2025. "Sabotage and Free Riding in Contests with a Group-Specific Public-Good/Bad Prize," Papers 2502.08100, arXiv.org.
10. Aner Sela, 2022. "Ineffective Prizes In Multi-Dimensional Contests," Working Papers 2205, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
11. Subhasish Chowdhury & Oliver Gürtler, 2015. "Sabotage in contests: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 135-155, July.
    • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Oliver Gurtler, 2013. "Sabotage in Contests: A Survey," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 051, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
12. Doron Klunover, 2020. "Nice guys don't always finish last: succeeding in hierarchical organizations," Papers 2007.04435, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
13. Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2016. "Law Enforcement in a Federal System: On the Strategic Choice of Sanction Levels," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 73-103.
14. Haoming Liu & Jingfeng Lu & Yohanes E. Riyanto & Zhe Wang, 2024. "Contests with multiplicative sabotage effect," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 499-526, November.
15. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2013. "Sabotage in Contests: An Overview," CESifo Working Paper Series 4422, CESifo.
16. Music, Kasim & Salzmann, Christian, 2020. "Why biased agencies could be the best monitors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
17. Mueller-Langer Frank & Andreoli-Versbach Patrick, 2017. "Leading-Effect, Risk-Taking and Sabotage in Two-Stage Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 237(1), pages 1-28, February.
    • Müller-Langer, Frank & Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick, 2017. "Leading-Effect, Risk-Taking and Sabotage in Two-Stage Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Munich Reprints in Economics 55040, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
18. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
19. Baharad, Roy & Cohen, Chen & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2022. "Litigation with adversarial efforts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
20. Minchuk, Yizhaq & Raveh, Ohad, 2025. "Can term limits reduce political sabotage? Evidence from negative campaigning in gubernatorial races," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
21. Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
22. Peter-J. Jost, 2021. "“The ball is round, the game lasts 90 minutes, everything else is pure theoryâ€," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(1), pages 27-74, January.
23. Aner Sela, 2024. "Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(4), pages 721-743, December.
24. Chung, A., 2024. "Target Setting in Contests with Sabotage," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2409, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
25. Serhat Doğan & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2019. "Sabotage in team contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 383-405, September.
26. Yun Kuen Cheung & Stefanos Leonardos & Georgios Piliouras & Shyam Sridhar, 2021. "From Griefing to Stability in Blockchain Mining Economies," Papers 2106.12332, arXiv.org.